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The Medical Care Recovery Act-Time
for a Checkup
DAVID L. ABNEY*
INTRODUCTION
When the federal government furnishes medical, surgical, or hos-
pital care and treatment to a person injured through the fault of a
third person, the federal government is statutorily entitled to subro-
gation. Under the Medical Care Recovery Act [hereinafter referred
to as MCRA], 1 the injured person or survivor is required to assign
his claim or cause of action against the tortious third party, to the
extent necessary to enable the federal government to recover the
reasonable value of treatment rendered. The Act only applies
"under circumstances creating a tort liability upon some third per-
son."'2 The purposes of the Act are to provide a statutory basis for
recovering medical expenses from the person who wrongfully
caused the initial injury and to provide the government with an al-
ternative source to pay its expenses.
However, in the past twenty years, state and federal court deci-
sions have construed the Act in a disparate fashion, generating un-
certainty and confusion. Insurance companies have modified their
vehicular medical payments clauses and uninsured motorist cover-
age to preclude recovery under the statute. State legislatures have
shifted to no-fault automobile insurance schemes which remove tort
liability and, therefore, the substantive basis of any MCRA tort
claim. Defendants have diligently discovered and exploited the var-
* Lieutenant David L. Abney is a Claims Attorney with the United States Navy
in San Diego, California. He has been admitted to practice in Arizona, California, and
the District of Columbia. B.A., University of Arizona (With Distinction), 1980; J.D.,
University of Arizona (With High Distinction), 1983; LL.M. Candidate, University of
San Diego.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2651-53 (1982). For a general introduction to the Act, see An-
not., 7 A.L.R. FED. 289 (1971). The complete text of the MCRA is set out in the
Appendix.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2651(a) (1982).
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ious weaknesses and loopholes in the MCRA, highlighting the
problem areas.
This Article argues that Congress should clarify the extent of the
federal right under the MCRA and thereby eliminate exploitation
of the Act under existing state substantive and procedural doc-
trines. The purpose, construction and nature of the MCRA are dis-
cussed. An analysis is made of methods of recovery and defenses
available to a MCRA claim. Guidelines for congressional revision
are also offered.
I. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
Congress passed the MCRA in 1962 as a belated response to the
1947 Supreme Court decision of United States v. Standard Oil Co.3
In that case, the Court denied the federal government the right to
sue a tortfeasor for the cost of medical care which the government
was statutorily required to provide an injured person.4 Stressing
national fiscal and military policy, Justice Rutledge declined to
fashion a federal common law remedy.5 However, the Court did
recommend legislative action.6
The original draft of the Act allowed only a derivative right of
recovery,7 whereby the United States could proceed by subrogation
to the rights of the victim, or under an assignment of his or her
rights against the tortfeasor.8 Amendments added the ability to
prosecute the claim independently.9 The MCRA expressly permits
the United States to enforce its recovery rights by direct legal ac-
3. 332 U.S. 301 (1947). "It took Congress fifteen years to fill the gap occasioned
by United States v. Standard Oil Co." United States v. Jones, 264 F. Supp. 11, 14 (E.D.
Va. 1967) (constitutionality of MCRA upheld).
4. 332 U.S. at 313. See, eg., 10 U.S.C. § 1074 (1982) (care for active duty mili-
tary); and 10 U.S.C. §§ 1079-86 (1982) (care for military retirees and their dependents).
5. 332 U.S. at 313.
6. Id. at 314.
7. For the history of the Act, see Bernzweig, Public Law 87-693: An Analysis and
Interpretation of the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1257
(1964); Paskoff, Tort Law and the Medical Care Recovery Act (Public Law 87-693), 15
NEB. ST. B.J. (1966). The official history is scanty and somewhat confused, but it may
be found at 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2637.
8. See generally Long, Government Recovery Beyond the Federal Medical Recovery
Act, 14 S. DAK. L. REv. 20 (1969); Noone, Federal Medical Care Recovery Act, 55
A.B.A. J. 259 (1969); Dingfelder, The Federal Medical Care Recovery Act-Today, 550
INS. L.J. 853 (1968); Note, The Medical Care Recovery Act, 23 RUTGERS L. REv. 141
(1968); Townsend, Some Comments on Federal Medical Recovery Act Decisions, 10 A.F.
JAG L. REv. 44 (July-Aug. 1968). The insurance industry has taken a somewhat less
than enthusiastic view of the MCRA. See Groce, The Federal Medical Care Recovery
Act and Its Side Effects, 36 INS. COUNS. J. 259 (April 1969); and Groce, Public Law 87-
693: The Federal Medical Care Recovery Act-A Partial Dissent, 509 INs. L.J. 337
(1965). See also Mog, Hospital Recovery Claims-Claims Under $100, 7 A.F. JAG L.
REV. 19 (Mar.-Apr. 1965).
9. See, e-g., Maddux v. Cox, 382 F.2d 119, 123 (8th Cir. 1967) (MCRA primarily
[Vol. 22
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tion, or by intervention or joinder in a lawsuit brought by the in-
jured party. 10 A majority of courts also allow the injured person to
assert a MCRA claim on behalf of the government against the
tortfeasor for the reasonable value of medical expenses incurred by
the government, as long as the claim is explicitly authorized by ap-
propriate government officials."1
"The legislative history of the MCRA reflects that foremost
among Congress' concerns was the annual loss which the govern-
ment sustained in the absence of a statute enabling it to recover
against responsible third parties."12 Also, the Act was intended to
prevent the victim from benefiting from free medical care as a result
of the collateral source rule in addition to suing for the reasonable
value13 of services rendered. Furthermore, the Act was aimed at
preventing unjust enrichment of third party tortfeasors and their
insurance companies, since the injured person normally could not
recover from them for medical expenses which had not been in-
curred personally.14 Functionally, the MCRA "operates to elimi-
nate bonus recoveries to injured federal beneficiaries or windfall
savings to tortfeasors or their insurance carriers, and to return vast
sums of money to the federal coffers."' 5
II. NATURE OF THE MCRA RIGHT
The Act creates an "independent substantive federal right, en-
acted by Congress pursuant to its constitutional powers in matters
of military affairs and federal fiscal policy.' 6 Although the
a fiscal measure). See also Comment, The Right and Remedies of the United States
Under the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act, 74 DICK. L. REv. 115 (1970).
10. See Long, Administration of the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act, 46 NoTRE
DAME LAW. 253 (Winter 1971).
11. Noone, May Plaintiffs Include the United States' Claim Under the Federal
Medical Care Recovery Act Without Government Intervention?, 10 A.F. JAG L. REv. 20
(Sept.-Oct. 1968).
12. United States v. Allstate Ins. Co., 573 F. Supp. 142, 145 (W.D. Mich. 1983)
(court concludes that Michigan no-fault automobile insurance law bars MCRA
recovery).
13. One federal district court judge seems to have overestimated the influence of
this problem on Congress when he stated that:
The primary purpose of the Act was to enable the United States, for the bene-
fit of its taxpayers, to recover the fair and reasonable value of expenditures
required by law which, prior to the passage of the Medical Care Recovery
Act, had operated as a "windfall" to the injured party under the expanded
decisions permitting recoveries pursuant to the collateral source doctrine.
United States v. Jones, 264 F. Supp. 11, 15 (E.D. Va. 1967), see supra note 3.
14. United States v. Leonard, 448 F. Supp. 99, 101 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (United
States held to be direct beneficiary of New York no-fault policy).
15. United States v. Thomas Jefferson Corp., 309 F. Supp. 1246, 1247 (W.D. Va.
1970) (government free to conduct MCRA suit in federal court despite parallel suit in
state court).
16. United States v. Moore, 469 F.2d 788, 793 (3d Cir. 1972) (MCRA overrides
1985]
3
Abney: The Medical Care Recovery Act -- Time for a Checkup
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1985
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
MCRA gives the government a right not cognizable at common
law, it should be interpreted generously. 17 "When a specific interest
and right has been conferred upon the United States by statute, the
remedies and procedures for enforcing that right are not to be nar-
rowly construed so as to prevent the effectuation of the policy de-
clared by Congress."18 In light of the remedial and fiscal nature of
the statute, courts should not place unnecessary roadblocks to re-
covery by the government.1 9
Although the statute entitles the United States to subrogation of
"any right or claim" which the victim may have against the third-
party tortfeasor,20 the exact meaning of the subrogation right is un-
certain. One court suggested that by employing the term "subro-
gated," Congress indicated that the independent federal
recoupment right was to be subject to any state substantive tort de-
fenses. This is definitely a minority position. 21 Another court has
styled the government's right as "an independent statutory right of
subrogation," which is actually a contradiction in terms, 22 since
subrogation is inherently a dependent right.
Subrogation was the only method and right of recovery in the
original version of the MCRA. However,
[t]he bill was amended to confer on the government an independ-
ent right of action and to free its right of subrogation from the
vagaries of state law. . . .The right of recovery was thus con-
ferred on the government and subrogation was made one of the
remedial consequences of the government's right, a subsidiary
equitable remedy, which did not limit the primary right.23
state family immunity laws), rem'd per curiam, 444 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. de-
nied, 411 U.S. 905 (1973).
17. United States v. Wittrock, 268 F. Supp. 325, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (settlement by
victim will not bar an MCRA suit by the United States).
18. United States v. York, 398 F.2d 582, 586 (6th Cir. 1968) (United States must
neither give notice of its MCRA claim nor notice of an assignment from the injured
person in order to preserve its rights).
19. United States v. Housing Auth. of City of Bremerton, 415 F.2d 239, 241-42
(9th Cir. 1969) (United States not barred by failure to intervene in lawsuit brought by
victim). See also Abston v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 131 Mich. App. 26, 29, 346 N.W.2d
63, 66 (1983) (dictum) (MCRA right is independent and does not rest on subrogation).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2651(a) (1982).
21. United States v. Fort Benning Rifle and Pistol Club, 387 F.2d 884, 887 (5th
Cir. 1967), see infra note 39 and accompanying text. See also Katz v. Greig, 234 Pa.
Super. 126, 131, 339 A.2d 115, 120 (1975) (concurring opinion) (MCRA not subject to
Pennsylvania statute of limitations), in which Judge Van der Voort declared: "What
the Recovery Act does is to create an independent right of action in the United States
and subjects it to the substantive right of the injured Plaintiff to recovery for his inju-
ries. The Act does not subject the United States to state procedural limitations."
22. United States v. Angel, 470 F. Supp. 934, 935 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) (MCRA not
controlled by Tennessee statute of limitations).
23. United States v. Merrigan, 389 F.2d 21, 24 (3d Cir. 1968) (remedies under the
MCRA are not limited to joinder or intervention despite prompt independent suit by
the victim). See also United States v. Bender Welding & Mach. Co., 558 F.2d 761 (5th
[Vol. 22
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In United States v. York, Circuit Judge Celebrezze concluded that
the independent MCRA right was "subrogated only in the sense
that the person sued by the Government must be liable to the in-jured person in tort."' 24 Considering the apparent legislative con-
cern with collateral-source windfalls to tort victims, Congress
probably only intended to ensure subrogation to any collateral-
source rights, denying them to the victim, since the government col-
lected through its independent right.25 The end result could be two
separate bases of recovery, but subrogation of whatever nature was
not by any means the focus of the MCRA. 26
Although a MCRA case may be heard in either state or federal
court, the right of recovery hinges upon the substantive tort law of
the appropriate state.27 Therefore, when suit is in federal court, andjurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, the choice of law
will be determined under state law.28 However, if the injury is not a
recognized tort under state law, then the United States is prevented
from seeking compensation under the MCRA.29 "The language of
the Act is clear and unambiguous. It authorizes the Government to
institute legal proceedings only against a person liable in tort."3 0
Cir. 1977) (federal government has standing to seek review of MCRA claim denied by a
state agency).
24. United States v. York, 398 F.2d 582, 584 (6th Cir. 1968), see supra note 18 and
accompanying text.
25. This would seem to be the point of Chief Judge Hoffman's comments that,
strictly speaking, the victim in MCRA cases has nothing to which the government can
be subrogated because the victim paid nothing for the medical care. United States v.
Jones, 264 F. Supp. 11, 15 (E.D. Va. 1967), see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
26. While the legislative history of the Recovery Act is not clear, the empha-
sis on the independent nature of the government's remedy under the amended
statute is apparent throughout. Despite the unfortunate language used in the
law as enacted, the legislative history tends to suggest an intention to create
more than one basis for recovery.
United States v. Neal, 443 F. Supp. 1307, 1310 (D. Neb. 1978) (state conflict of law
rules determine whether a guest statute bars MCRA recovery).
27. See supra note I and Appendix. See also United States v. Allstate Ins. Co., 573
F. Supp. 142, 145 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (court concludes that Michigan no-fault law abol-
ishes tort liability, and hence MCRA claim).
28. The choice of law analysis may turn on the fundamental federal interests and
constitutional sources involved. Colden v. Asmus, 322 F. Supp. 1163, 1164-65 (S.D.
Cal. 1971) (dictum) (military habeas corpus action); but see United States v. Neal, 443
F. Supp. 1307, 1314 (D. Neb. 1978), in which Judge Deaney maintained that the proper
conflicts of law rules for MCRA cases should be state rules, not federal rules.
29. The United States might claim against any applicable insurance contract as a
third-party beneficiary or as an additional insured. See, eg., United States v. Criterion
Ins. Co., 596 P.2d 1203 (Clo. 1979) (en banc) (court holds United States is a third-
party beneficiary under Colorado no-fault automobile insurance law), answering ques-
tions certified in, United States v. Criterion Ins. Co., 587 F.2d 39 (10th Cir. 1978); see
also 608 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1979) (same case subsequently remanded to District Court).
30. United States v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 527 F.2d 564, 566 (8th Cir. 1976) (re-
fusing to create a direct action against the liability insurer for the insured MCRA
tortfeasor) (emphasis in original).
1985]
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If the facts evidence tort liability, then courts have generally con-
cluded that the federal claim defeats procedural state defenses, un-
less the defense meritoriously negates the tort itself.31 For instance,
a MCRA claim is not defeated by state statutes of limitations, 32
interspousal immunity, 33 or automobile guest statutes.34 Indeed,
the United States might be able to proceed despite circumstances
which would bar an action by the actual tort victim. 35 In those
states which have abolished certain tort liabilities, such as under
workmen's compensation plans36 or no-fault automobile insurance
schemes,37 the courts have generally denied the propriety of a
MCRA action.38
Under the MCRA, the United States may recover only the rea-
sonable value of medical and dental treatment which it is author-
ized or required by law to provide the tort victim. 39 The Act
empowers the President of the United States to prescribe regula-
tions establishing the value of medical care provided directly or in-
directly by the federal government. 40 In turn, the President has
authorized the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
[hereinafter referred to as OMB], to set the amount recoverable for
31. The United States is not subject to the "vagaries and inconsistencies of the laws
of the various states," once tort liability is initially established. Government Employees
Ins. Co. v. Bates, 414 F. Supp. 658, 659 (E.D. Ark. 1975) (state guest statute not a bar
to MCRA claim).
32. United States v. Jackson, 572 F. Supp. 181, 184 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (federal
statute of limitations controls in MCRA case), motion for reconsideration denied, 577 F.
Supp. 901 (W.D. Mich. 1984).
33. United States v. Haynes, 445 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971) (Louisiana spousal com-
munity property immunity overridden by the MCRA).
34. United States v. Forte, 427 F. Supp. 340, 342 (D. Del. 1977) (Delaware guest
statute is substantive law, but the United States is not subject to the statute since it
"does not operate to purge an automobile owner or operator of any and all tort liabil-
ity.") Contra United States v. Oliveira, 489 F. Supp. 981 (D.S.D. 1980) (state guest
statute will bar a MCRA claim since the law is substantive).
35. United States v. Greene, 266 F. Supp. 976, 978 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (the release of
the tort victim and an expired state statute of limitations would not bar the United
States). Once the United States passes the appropriate tort threshold, it has "an unchal-
lenged right to recover for medical expenses against the tort-feasor." Hildebrandt v.
Kalteux, 98 Misc. 2d 1062, 1064, 415 N.Y.S.2d 383, 385 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 1979)
(MCRA claim valid despite fact New York no-fault law precluded any recovery for
medical expenses made by the tort victim personally).
36. United States v. Gusto Distrib. Co., 329 F. Supp. 578 (D. Mont. 1971) (court
found state workmen's compensation act denied tort liability).
37. Heusle v. National Mut. Ins. Co., 628 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1980) (Pennsylvania
no-fault law barred MCRA claim).
38. See, eg., United States v. Fort Benning Rifle and Pistol Club, 387 F.2d 884
(5th Cir. 1967) (United States not amenable to Georgia statute of limitations); and
Lorenzetti v. United States, 710 F.2d 982, 986-87 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2284
(1984) (dictum) (must be tort liability for the MCRA to apply).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2651(a) (1982). See also supra note 4.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2652(a) (1982).
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medical services by means of the MCRA 41 For care given at gov-
ernment facilities, the OMB establishes per diem figures which are
quite conservative in comparison with civilian charges for similar
treatment.4 2 However, when the government pays for medical serv-
ices rendered at a facility not operated by the United States, the
amount recoverable under the MCRA is the actual civilian bill, nor-
mally a figure significantly higher than the governmental rate.43
Courts have been divided on what effect to give the statutory
MCRA recovery rates. Some courts have given the statutory fees
conclusive effect,44 while other courts have been more flexible. 45
However, the consensus appears to be that the rates established by
regulation, pursuant to Executive order and the MCRA, are not
subject to attack for being unreasonable and arbitrary.46 A rebutta-
ble presumption exists that OMB rates are proper in comparison
with prevailing local civilian charges. 47 But in order to create the
presumption of propriety, the federal government has the burden of
proving the rate-setting regulations are consistent with the MCRA,
are within the authority of the promulgating officer, and are not
arbitrarily and capriciously made.48 The rates will be upheld if the
OMB based its decision on a consideration of relevant factors with-
out the injection of any clear errors of judgment.49 However, on
occasion defendants have proven the rates charged were inappropri-
41. Exec. Order No. 11,541, 35 Fed. Reg. 10,737 (1970).
42. There are three general sets of rates for the facilities of the three major federal
health care providers: the Department of Defense, the Department of Health and
Human Services, and the Veterans' Administration. The per diem rates are based on
average expenditures and historical costs, and are modest. For instance, a day of inpa-
tient care at an Army hospital would be $452, even if the patient was in surgery all day.
The outpatient rate would only be $56, no matter how long the visit or the type of
treatment. 49 Fed. Reg. 45,280 (Nov. 15, 1984). Comparable civilian costs are much
higher. For instance, the average United States daily cost of a nongovernmental short-
term general hospital stay was already $325 in 1981. The rate in California was $500 by
then. The rates have gone much higher since then. United States Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1984, at 114 (104th ed. 1983).
43. See supra note 42.
44. See, e.g., Phillips v. Trame, 252 F. Supp. 948, 951 (E.D. IMI. 1966) (court de-
cided rates not challengeable on grounds they are unreasonable or arbitrary if deter-
mined as a result of action by direction of Bureau of Budget pursuant to Executive
order); and Petersen v. Head Constr. Co., 367 F. Supp. 1072, 1080 (D.D.C. 1973) (value
of treatment was "conclusively measured by the rates" established by the predecessor
agency to the OMB).
45. See, eg., Murphy v. Smith, 243 F. Supp. 1006, 1015-17 (E.D.S.C. 1965)
(United States allowed to intervene in primary case to pursue MCRA claim); and Tolli-
ver v. Shumate, 151 W.Va. 105, 109, 150 S.E.2d 579, 583 (1966) (court concludes that
MCRA recovery rates may not always constitute sufficient proof standing alone).
46. United States v. Jones, 264 F. Supp. 11, 14 (E.D. Va. 1967), see supra note 3.
47. United States v. Wall, 670 F.2d 469, 470 (4th Cir. 1982) (appellate court con-
cluded that summary judgment based solely on the OMB rates was improper).
48. Id. at 471.
49. Id.
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ate by arguing that servicemen are frequently kept in a military hos-
pital for longer periods of time than a civilian in a civilian hospital
would be, since servicemen cannot return to duty and they cannot
be sent home for rehabilitation.50
The government normally submits a MCRA "bill" in the form of
a summarization or statement of charges.5 1 A government state-
ment of charges listing medical expenses and prepared in accord-
ance with the MCRA by the appropriate claims official, comes
within the business records exception to the hearsay rule and is,
therefore, admissible evidence in court.52 The preparing official or
an outside expert may also testify directly concerning the method of
preparation and the comparable civilian charges.5 3
The MCRA claim is often incorrectly referred to as a "lien"
against the tortfeasor or his insurance carrier.54 One of the major
problems with the present MCRA is that it does not give the gov-
ernment a claim against the property of the wrongdoer or of anyone
else, as a lien would do.55 The Act ony provides for a "cause of
action against the tortfeasor. ' '56 There is no lien in the legal sense,
but simply an independent right of the government to sue on its
own behalf.57
III. METHODS OF RECOVERY
By joinder or intervention, the United States may become a party
to any action brought by the victim "six months after the first day
in which care and treatment is furnished by the United States in
connection with the injury or disease involved."58 During the first
six months, the injured person may sue without any fear of govern-
mental intervention or joinder. However, after the six-month pe-
riod, the United States can sue the tortfeasor directly, either alone
50. United States v. Jones, 264 F. Supp. 11, 14 (E.D. Va. 1967), see supra note 3.
51. See, eg., Criterion Ins. Co. v. Starkes, 249 Md. 694, 695, 241 A.2d 707, 708
(1968) (private plaintiff held to "incur" medical expense; therefore, suit for MCRA
recovery allowed); Aspuria v. Mello, 255 Or. 128, 131, 464 P.2d 680, 681 (1970).
52. Thomas v. Owens, 28 Md. App. 442, 445-46, 346 A.2d 662, 665-66 (Ct. Spec.
App. 1975) (court admits Department of Health, Education and Welfare letter itemiz-
ing the government's MCRA claim).
53. Id.
54. See, eg., Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1264 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982) (dictum) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (soldier denied right to sue
his superior officers for alleged constitutional torts). "Indeed the United States has
provided itself by law with a subrogation lien on claims against third parties for injury
to servicemen for those expenses it has incurred." Id.
55. Thomas v. Shelton, 740 F.2d 478, 482 (7th Cir. 1984) (court refused to allow
the United States to remove a state court action to federal court).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2651(b) (1982). See supra note 1 and Appendix.
[Vol. 22
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or in conjunction with the victim.59 The suit may be brought in the
name of the federal government or in the name of the injured
person.6°
At first glance, the MCRA remedies appear very limited. Indeed,
by its language, the Act would appear to bar any governmental ac-
tion if the victim files suit within the first six months after care is
initially given. 61 Yet, overwhelmingly, the courts have striven to
read some flexibility into the Act's various procedural devices.62
"[The] independent right of action should be construed as permit-
ting the government to assert its claim in any of a wide variety of
possible procedural alternatives. ' 63 Construction of the procedural
provisions should be "in aid of the substantive right which the stat-
ute has created." 64 "Despite the unfortunate language used in the
law as enacted, the legislative history tends to suggest an intention
to create more than one basis for recovery," and more than one
method.65
Some early lower court decisions interpreted the six-month provi-
sion in the Act quite literally. If the tort victim sued within those
first six months after the start of government treatment, and the
United States failed to join or intervene in the private action, then
the MCRA claim was permanently lost. 66 There was general disa-
greement on the propriety of this approach,67 until the federal ap-
pellate courts concluded in 1969 that the statutory method of
recovery was permissive and not mandatory. 68 "The truth of the
matter is that the six months provision is an incongruous residue
left in the statute from the earlier intention to provide the govern-
ment no more than a derivative right of subrogation. ' 69 As it
stands now, the government must merely wait six months after care
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Katz v. Greig, 234 Pa. Super. 126, 129, 339 A.2d 115, 118 (1975), see
supra note 21 and accompanying text.
63. Leatherman v. Pollard Trucking Co., 482 F. Supp. 351, 353 (E.D. Okla. 1978)
(court refused to order joinder of the United States).
64. United States v. Merrigan, 389 F.2d 21, 24 (3d Cir. 1968), see supra note 23.
65. United States v. Neal, 443 F. Supp. 1307, 1310 (D. Neb. 1978), see supra note
26.
66. See, eg., United States v. York, 261 F. Supp. 713, 714 (W.D. Tenn. 1966) (trial
court strictly construed MCRA to deny federal government the right to sue), rev'd, 398
F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Housing Auth. of City of Bremerton, 276 F.
Supp. 966, 969 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (United States prevented from instituting independ-
ent MCRA action when victim brought speedy suit), rev'd, 415 F.2d 239 (9th Cir.
1969).
67. See, eg., United States v. Wittrock, 268 F. Supp. 325, 326-27 (E.D. Pa. 1967),
see supra note 17.
68. See supra note 66.
69. United States v. Merrigan, 389 F.2d 21, 25 (3d Cir. 1968), see supra note 23.
1985]
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is first given and then it can sue, even if the victim has already
brought suit.70
When asserting its claim directly, the United States may proceed
either administratively or through litigation. The head of the de-
partment or agency responsible for recovering on a particular
MCRA claim has discretion, in conformity with regulatory guide-
lines, to initiate, compromise, settle and release claims, or to waive
any claim, in whole or in part, "for the convenience of the Govern-
ment" or when collection would cause "undue hardship" to the in-
jured person.71 To assist in the collection of its claim, the United
States may force the victim to assign to it any cause of action
against the tortfeasor, to furnish information regarding the injury,
to notify the government of any settlement offers, and to cooperate
generally.72 Once enough data are available, the appropriate agency
will send a notice of claim to the tortfeasor and the tortfeasor's in-
surance company.73
A. Effect of Notice
The notice of claim has no legal effect.74 Indeed, the government
need not give any notice at all to potential defendants and their
insurers as to its claim or intentions concerning a possible MCRA
assertion.75 Tort liability need not be first established in order for
the United States to submit its claim, although it would be a predi-
cate to any claim enforcement proceedings.76 The United States
may claim directly from the tortfeasor, from that person's liability
insurer, and sometimes from the victim's own insurer, if the proper
insurance coverage is present.77 Although the government is free to
70. Id.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2652(b) (1982). The general Department of Justice guidelines may
be found at 28 C.F.R. § 43.2 (1984).
72. 28 C.F.R. § 43.2 (1984). See also United States v. Ammons, 242 F. Supp. 461,
463 (N.D. Fla. 1965) (government precluded from suing the victim).
73. See, eg., 32 C.F.R. §§ 537.21-537.24 (1984) (Army regulations); and 32 C.F.RL
§ 757 (Navy regulations).
74. There is no provision at all in the statute for the giving of notice or prescribing
any legal ramifications of notice. See supra note 1 and Appendix.
75. See, eg., United States v. Bartholomew, 266 F. Supp. 213, 215 (W.D. Okla.
1967) (government delayed suit until after the victim had given releases to the
tortfeasor); United States v. York, 398 F.2d 582, 584 (6th Cir. 1968), see supra note 18.
76. United States v. Gera, 279 F. Supp. 731, 733 (W.D. Pa. 1968) (MCRA not
bound by state statute of limitations), rev'd on other grounds, 409 F.2d 117 (3d Cir.
1969).
77. See, eg., Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Rozmyslowicz, 449 F. Supp. 68
(E.D.N.Y. 1978) (direct claim against tortfeasor's insurance company), affd sub noniL,
United States v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 605 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1979); Govern-
ment Employees Ins. Co. v. United States, 376 F.2d 836 (4th Cir. 1967) (claim against
victim's uninsured motorist coverage); United States v. Government Employees Ins.
Co., 330 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D.N.C. 1971) (claim against victim's automobile insurance
medical payments coverage), aff'd, 461 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1972); and United States v.
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claim against an insurance company, the MCRA does not allow any
direct action against the tortfeasor's liability insurer, only against
the tortfeasor.78
B. Intervention or Joinder
If the notice of claim induces no payment, the United States may
intervene or join in any court action brought against the tortfeasor
by the victim. 79 Once the federal government intervenes in a state
court action, it may not remove the case to federal court merely
because it is prosecuting a MCRA claim.80 The United States has
the choice of starting a separate action in federal court in the first
place, and is generally prevented from litigating a state court action
in federal court without an independent jurisdictional basis.81 Simi-
larly, if the government is joined on defendant's motion in a state
court proceeding, the United States may not remove to federal
court based solely on its MCRA rights.82 When necessary, the
courts will order the joinder of the United States to allow a com-
plete and swift resolution of the case.83
C. Direct Legal Action
After observing the six-month statutory waiting period, the
United States may sue on its own in either state or federal court. 84
Since the Act specifically preserves the injured party's right to seek
any damages not recoverable by the government under the
Haynes, 445 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971) (direct action against tortfeasor and other
defendants).
78. United States v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 527 F.2d 564, 565 (8th Cir. 1976)
(court held MCRA does not authorize suit based on insurance contract, only one based
in tort).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2651(b)(2) (1982). See also Rexrode v. American Laundry Press
Co., 674 F.2d 826, 827 n.1 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 862 (1982) (after
intervention by the government, the value of the MCRA award was deducted from the
total value of the private plaintiffs recovery). The MCRA gives the United States the
"absolute right" to intervene in any applicable state or federal court action. Heffernan
v. Hertz Corp., 34 A.D.2d 552, 553, 309 N.Y.S.2d 706, 707 (App. Div. 1970) (appellate
court reversed trial court denial of motion by the United States for leave to intervene as
a party plaintiff to recover medical expenses under the MCRA). See also Gumenick v.
United States, 213 Va. 510, 193 S.E.2d 788 (1973) (joint action brought by the tort
victim and the United States).
80. Smith v. Saint Luke's Hosp., 480 F. Supp. 58, 60-61 (D.S.D. 1979) (district
court granted defendant's motion for an order remanding the cause to state court).
81. Id.
82. Thomas v. Shelton, 740 F.2d 478, 486-88 (7th Cir. 1984), see supra note 55.
83. See, e.g., Heusle v. National Mut. Ins. Co., 479 F. Supp. 274 (M.D. Pa. 1979),
see supra note 37; and Babcock v. Maple Leaf, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 428, 431 (E.D. Tenn.
1976) (court allowed government an opportunity to intervene in products liability suit
before joinder will be mandated in order to conclude all issues of MCRA-related
liability).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 2651(b)(2) (1982).
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MCRA, 85 concurrent actions by the victim and the federal govern-
ment will occur.86 Hence, the Act does not hinder parallel actions
against the tortfeasor; that is, one by the government for medical
treatment costs and one by the victim for other damages.87
In pursuing its direct action, the government may implead other
parties as needed for a full adjudication of the MCRA claim.88
Once the parties are impleaded, the United States may assert its
MCRA and related claims.89 The federal government may not im-
plead or sue the tort victim under the Act.90 However, since the
United States may sue in the name of the injured person, 91 the jury
"will not be inclined to reduce the verdict as it otherwise might
were it aware that the medical expenses were borne by the Govern-
ment, which many people regard as an infinite source of giveaways
of every kind and character."'92
D. Action by the Private Plaintiff
By far, the most popular and productive method of recovery is
one not even mentioned in the MCRA.93 Under this approach, a
private attorney hired by the tort victim agrees to include the gov-
ernment's statutory MCRA claim in the private complaint against
the tortfeasor.94 However, an appropriate government agency must
give express authorization and consent that the private attorney
may prosecute the recovery on behalf of the United States.95 If the
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2652(c) (1982).
86. See, e.g., Seneca v. Mohawk, 52 A.D.2d 1056, 384 N.Y.S.2d 564 (App. Div.
1976) (United States started separate action to recover MCRA costs).
87. United States v. Merrigan, 389 F.2d 21, 25 (3d Cir. 1968), see supra note 23.
See also United States v. Thomas Jefferson Corp., 309 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (W.D. Va.
1970), see supra note 15.
88. Hipp v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 1152, 1156 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (in a suit
arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act, court allowed the United States to serve and
file MCRA-related cross-claims). The United States may pursue any counterclaims,
cross-claims and other normal trial remedies as necessary. See, eg., Magno v. Corros,
439 F. Supp. 592, 595 (D.S.C. 1977), rev'd, 630 F.2d 224 (1980), cert denied, 451 U.S.
970 (1981) (United States asserted a MCRA counterclaim in a Federal Tort Claims Act
action).
89. Id.
90. "Nowhere in the law is the United States permitted to bring an action against
the serviceman, as they are seeking to do in this case." United States v. Ammons, 242
F. Supp. 461, 463 (N.D. Fla. 1965), see supra note 72.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2651(b)(2) (1982).
92. United States v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 527 F.2d 564, 567 (8th Cir. 1976), see
supra note 78.
93. Long, supra note 10, at 276-94.
94. See, e.g., Sandoval v. Valdez, 91 N.M. 705, 580 P.2d 131 (Ct. App. 1978) (pri-
vate plaintiff sued tortfeasor under the MCRA and his own insurance company under
the uninsured motorist coverage); Smartt v. Fleming, 481 S.W.2d 774 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1972) (private plaintiff asserting MCRA claim lost on the merits).
95. See, e.g., Cook v. Stuples, 74 F.R.D. 370, 371 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (defendant's
motion to force joinder of the United States denied); Palmer v. Sterling Drugs, Inc., 343
12
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complaint has already been filed, the plaintiff may normally amend
the complaint to include an allegation for the reasonable cost of the
medical care and treatment furnished to the victim by the federal
government. 96 Of course, the private plaintiff need not assert a
MCRA claim if that is deemed somehow harmful or inappropriate
to the tort victim's interests.97
Once the victim's attorney agrees to assert the government's
claim, proof of proper governmental consent and authorization
must be made part of the official record of the case.98 Once given
authority, the victim's attorney may pursue the full MCRA claim
arising from the tortious injury to the victim.99 Although the pri-
vate lawyer is acting on behalf of the United States, assertion of a
MCRA claim is not an independent jurisdictional basis for a civil
suit in federal district court. 100 However, since the private party
does represent the government's claim, both he and the United
States are bound by the judgment or settlement, thus precluding
any double payment by the tortfeasor of the MCRA assertion.101
Agreeing to assert the MCRA claim for the United States has
some important consequences. First, no portion of the MCRA
award may be used for private attorney fees.102 The Act simply
makes no provision for attorney fees, and the courts have unani-
F. Supp. 692, 696 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (defendant's motion to strike or dismiss denied where
private plaintiff allowed to prosecute government's MCRA claim).
96. See, e.g., Matney v. Evans, 93 N.M. 182, 186, 598 P.2d 644, 648 (Ct. App.
1979) (dismissal not warranted since the United States was not an indispensable party
where the private plaintiff asserted MCRA claim on the government's behalf).
97. United States v. Jones, 264 F. Supp. 11, 14 (E.D. Va. 1967), see supra note 3.
98. See, e.g., Kenneally v. Thurn, 653 S.W.2d 69, 72 (Tex. Civ. App. 1983) (with-
out authorization private plaintiff lacked power to sue on behalf of the United States);
Cushman v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 401 So. 2d 477 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (plaintiff's
failure to show authorization defeated MCRA claim); and Sabino v. Independent Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 292 So. 2d 662, 667 (Ala. Civ. App. 1974) (absent proper consent
and authorization, private plaintiff's MCRA award by the trial court was
unsupportable).
99. Standefer v. United States, 511 F.2d 101, 106-07 (5th Cir. 1975) (dictum) (Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act suit based on negligent treatment at a Veterans' Administration
Hospital).
100. See, eg., Becote v. South Carolina Highway Dept., 308 F. Supp. 1266, 1267(D.S.C. 1970) (defendant's motion to dismiss private suit containing MCRA claim
granted for lack of federal jurisdiction). It is doubtful that the plaintiff can include the
total of the MCRA claim to reach the federal diversity amount. Albright v. R.J. Rey-
nolds Tobacco Co., 350 F. Supp. 341, 350 (V.D. Pa. 1972) (wrongful death claim
against the City of Pittsburgh and others), aff'd, 485 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 951 (1974).
101. Leatherman v. Pollard Trucking Co., 482 F. Supp. 351, 354 (E.D. Okla. 1978),
see supra note 63.
102. See, eg., Hedgebeth v. Medford, 139 N.J. Super. 41, 44, 352 A.2d 267, 270
(App. Div. 1976) (dictum) (in recovery under the New Jersey Medicaid Program, court
refused to reduce the state's award by a pro rata share of attorney fees for the benefit of
the private plaintiff's counsel).
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mously refused to award them under any theory. 10 3 Second, when
the private attorney undertakes prosecution of the MCRA claim,
the attorney also assumes a personal and professional obligation to
act in the best interests of the United States. 104 The applicable stan-
dard is that of a fiduciary105
The attorney is bound to promptly pay the government any
money received in payment of the MCRA claim.10 6 The responsi-
bility to pay, however, is upon the private counsel, not the injured
party.107 Even if the private attorney has not agreed to cooperate
with the United States in asserting the MCRA claim, any funds
received by the attorney in satisfaction of a MCRA claim must be
held in trust for later distribution to the federal government.' 0 8 In
short, any private attorney who receives money earmarked as a
MCRA claim payment must place the money in trust, with any im-
proper disposal of the money constituting a breach of fiduciary
duty. 109
There may appear to be little incentive for a plaintiffs attorney to
cooperate with the government in pursuing recovery on a MCRA.
claim. However, in actuality, the benefits of prosecuting the gov-
ernment's MCRA claim so far outweigh any disadvantages that it
may well be malpractice to refuse to assist the United States in ob-
taining its MCRA recovery." 0
To aid in establishing the plaintiff's case, the government will fur-
103. See, eg., United States v. Nation, 299 F. Supp. 266, 267 (N.D. Okla. 1969)
(United States not obligated to pay private attorney any money out of a MCRA recov-
ery despite "created fund" and private attorney general theories).
104. See, eg., In re Minor, 681 P.2d 1347 (Alaska 1983) (Attorney who had agreed
to represent the government in a MCRA claim, failed to disburse the settlement to the
United States and to keep the government apprised of settlement negotiations. Finding
her conduct dishonest, the Alaska Supreme Court ordered a 90-day suspension with
reinstatement conditioned on restitution to the United States.).
105. Id.
106. See, eg., Brackens v. Allstate Ins. Co., 339 So.2d 486, 487 (La. Ct. App. 1976")
(no recovery allowed under the medical payments coverage); Hanley v. Condrey, 467
F.2d 697, 699 (2d Cir. 1972) (plaintiff's attorney reprimanded for wrongfully holding on
to government checks); and United States v. Bates, 360 F. Supp. 1195, 1196 (M.D. Fla.
1973) (private attorneys must pay MCRA proceeds over to the United States according
to the terms of the agreement with the government).
107. See, eg., Irby v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 175 So.2d 9, 11 (La. Ct.
App. 1965) (victim not personally responsible to pay MCRA recovery to the United
States).
108. See, eg., In re Burns, 139 Ariz. 487, 679 P.2d 510 (1984) (en bane) (private
attorney suspended from legal practice for one year for failure to protect the govern-
ment's MCRA interest in a payment made by the tortfeasor's insurer).
109. See, e.g., In re Minor, 681 P.2d 1347, 1350 (Alaska 1983), see supra note 104.
110. Effective cooperation with the government will maximize the client's recovery
and speed the successful resolution of the case. The attainment of these goals is the
essence of zealous client representation. See, eg., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1981); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3
(1983).
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nish official medical records covering the treatment of the tort vic-
tim.1" When reasonably available, expert witnesses will also be
provided; testifying with regards to the medical care given, the med-
ical causes of the bodily injury, and the overall prognosis.1 12 Often
the appropriate claims officer will prepare a statement of the rea-
sonable value of the treatment costs, which may then be asserted as
an item of special damages.' 13 Such special damages provide a con-
crete basis for valuing and alleging the general damages in the case.
Without an official "bill," often the injured person cannot realisti-
cally assert special damages, since most MCRA victims are given
governmental care at no personal charge. 114 The greatest incentive
may well be that plaintiff's attorney pays nothing for these
services. 115
Cooperation with the government actually gives plaintiff's coun-
sel greater control over the case than proceeding alone. The United
States will completely refrain from any separate negotiations with
the tortfeasor or any insurance carrier. 116 The United States will
neither begin an independent collection action nor join in plaintiff's
lawsuit.117 Nonintervention is an important benefit, since then the
jury will not be "distracted from the main issues of liability and
damages by the fact that the United States is a party because it
furnished hospital and medical services free of charge to the plain-
tiff."118 Moreover, the defendant is denied the right to join the
United States when the plaintiff is already asserting the govern-
ment's claim."19
By suing on behalf of the government, the victim/client gains a
direct pecuniary benefit. The government may waive or compro-
mise part or all of its MCRA claim when collection would result in
undue hardship to the injured person or when it would be disadvan-
111. See, eg., In re Burns, 139 Ariz. 487, 488, 679 P.2d 510, 511 (1984), see supra
note 108 and accompanying text.
112. Id.
113. See, eg., 32 C.F.R. § 537.24 (1984) (Army regulations); and 32 C.F.R. § 757.5
(1984) (Navy regulations).
114. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. See also Brooks v. Plumbers &
Steamfitters Local 106 Health & Welfare Fund, 464 So. 2d 26, 27-28 (La. Ct. App.
1985) (victim paid Veterans' Administration according to its MCRA subrogation
rights, but victim was still not personally liable).
115. See Annot., 7 A.L.R. FED. 289, 298 (1971).
116. In re Burns, 139 Ariz. 487, 488, 679 P.2d 510, 511 (1984), see supra note 108.
117. See, eg., Leatherman v. Pollard Trucking Co., 482 F. Supp. 351, 354 (E.D.
Okla. 1978), see supra note 63.
118. Conley v. Maattala, 303 F. Supp. 484, 485 (D.N.H. 1969) (private plaintiff
permitted to pursue MCRA claim).
119. See, eg., Palmer v. Sterling Drugs, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 692, 696 (E.D. Pa. 1972),
see supra note 95. In Palmer, the court also concluded there was no prejudice to the
defendant if a private plaintiff was allowed to assert a claim on behalf of the federal
government. Id.
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tageous for the United States to pursue the full MCRA claim. 120
Some factors which may be relevant to this determination are: (1)
the "degree and permanency of any disability;" (2) whether the vic-
tim is entitled to future government medical care; (3) the amount of
out-of-pocket medical and legal expenses; (4) the victim's future
economic prospects; and, (5) the "anticipated amount of the gross
recovery." 121 If the United States releases or waives part of the pro-
ceeds, which the private plaintiff has received in settlement or judg-
ment, the tortfeasor must still provide full payment.122 The waiver
by the United States of its right to recoup the total medical expenses
under the MCRA is a "matter of grace exercised in the discretion of
the Sovereign," and inures to the sole benefit of the injured per-
son. 123 Thus, monetarily there is nothing to lose and everything to
gain from cooperating with the federal government.
The conflict of interest problem is a chimera. In most cases, the
client has no right at all to recover the MCRA expenses also being
sought by the United States. This is because most courts hold that
the victim who was given free medical care by the government has
"incurred" no compensable expense. 124 In those jurisdictions in
which the victim could assert some sort of collateral source theory
of recovery, there is also no conflict in choosing to aid the federal
government.1 25 The government may merely force the victim to as-
sign all collateral source or other reimbursement rights to the
United States, and then proceed independently. 126 By cooperating,
the private attorney gains many practical benefits for the injured
party and, clearly, makes the best of a situation in which the gov-
ernment really does hold the winning hand.127
Authorizing private attorneys to prosecute MCRA claims works
very well, except that it is "not within the clearly defined method
granted the United States in enforcing the recovery of these
120. 42 U.S.C. § 2652(b) (1982).
121. See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 757.5 (1984) (Navy regulations).
122. Hughes v. Sanders, 287 F. Supp. 332, 334 (E.D. Okla. 1968) (defendant denied
relief from the judgment because of partial waiver of MCRA claim by the United
States).
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Mayor & Aldermen of the City of Savannah v. George, 161 Ga. App.
69, 288 S.E.2d 830 (1982) (dictum) (person who neither paid directly for services nor
could be required to pay was not entitled to claim).
125. On the collateral source rule in this context, see generally Annot., 77 A.L.R.3D
366 (1977).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 2651(a) (1982).
127. The situation is not nearly as confused and gloomy as that portrayed by some
commentators. See, e.g., Peterson, Agreeing to Protect the Interests of the United States
Under the Medical Care Recovery Act: Some Ethical Problems for the Attorney, 30 JAG
J. 203 (1978).
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funds." 128 "There is no provision in the Statute for the United
States to enforce its rights under any common law subrogation the-
ory wherein the accommodated person would simply include the
government's claim as his own." 129 A persistent minority of courts
have maintained that if the government seeks a MCRA recovery,
then it must become a party in the appropriate action.130 The great
weight of authority supports the private enforcement concept; how-
ever, uncertainty would be decreased and collections increased if
Congress were to amend the MCRA to explicitly sanction the pri-
vate attorney approach.131
IV. DEFENSES
Since the MCRA depends on state substantive tort law to deter-
mine liability, 132 numerous state-law defenses have been raised to
block recovery. 133 Some courts have tended to regard procedural
defenses as ineffective, while giving effect to substantive defenses. 134
The distinction between valid and invalid defenses does not really
"fall along the traditional but uncertain line" between substance
and procedure. 135 Only if a state law purges the third party of "any
and all tort liability," will a legitimate defense to a MCRA claim be
128. Katz v. Greig, 234 Pa. Super. 126, 134, 339 A.2d 115, 123 (1975) (Price, J.,
concurring and dissenting), see supra note 21.
129. Carrington v. Vanlinder, 58 Misc.2d 80, 83-84, 294 N.Y.S.2d 412, 415-16 (Sup.
Ct. 1968) (court denied plaintiff leave to amend complaint to include MCRA claim on
behalf of the United States).
130. See, eg., Michael v. Sylvester, 102 F.R.D. 229, 230 (D. Conn. 1984) (court
denied private plaintiff leave to amend complaint to allege a cause of action under the
MCRA on behalf of the United States); Joyce v. Winkler, 71 A.D.2d 28, 30, 421
N.Y.S.2d 480, 482 (App. Div. 1979) (dictum) (in a Federal Employment Compensation
action, court held recovery of Postal Service claim is not part of the plaintiff's suit); and
Smith v. Foucha, 172 So. 2d 318, 322 (La. Ct. App.), writ refused, 247 La. 678, 173 So.
2d 542 (1965) (court denied to private plaintiff the right to pursue MCRA claim on
behalf of the federal government).
131. Tort victims across the nation have routinely been allowed to assert the inter-
ests of the United States, resulting in large recoveries. Leatherman v. Pollard Trucking
Co., 482 F. Supp. 351, 353-54 (E.D. Okla. 1978), see supra note 63.
132. See, e.g., Heusle v. National Mut. Ins. Co., 628 F.2d 833, 837 (3d Cir. 1980),
supra note 37; and Howard v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 372 F. Supp. 854, 858 (N.D. Ga.
1974) (court concluded that civil rights employment discrimination action does not
sound in tort).
133. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 141-67 and
accompanying text.
134. "The right held by the United States under § 2651 is also a separate federal
right which, when asserted, is not subject to procedural or contractual infirmities which
might bar an action by the tort victim." United States v. Greene, 266 F. Supp. 976, 978
(N.D. Ill. 1967). See supra note 35. See also United States v. Stinnett, 318 F. Supp.
1337, 1338 (W.D. Okla. 1970) (state rules against splitting a cause of action were inap-
plicable since the MCRA cause of action was independent).
135. United States v. Fort Benning Rifle and Pistol Club, 387 F.2d 884, 887 (5th
Cir. 1967), see supra note 21.
1985]
17
Abney: The Medical Care Recovery Act -- Time for a Checkup
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1985
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
recognized. 136 Because the MCRA creates an independent federal
right and cause of action, arguably, "recovery can be barred only by
a federal statute or federal decisional law." 137 However, courts
have definitely not gone that far.
"The cases which have sought to apply the Act demonstrate that
those defenses which have nothing to do with whether the circum-
stances surrounding the injury create a tort, cannot defeat the in-
dependent right of the United States to recover."1 38 As long as tort
liability exists, any barriers to the right of a victim to recover are
not binding on the federal government. 139 Cases construing the
MCRA reflect the courts' difficulty in distinguishing situations
which "bar the entire cause of action against the tortfeasor rather
than merely limit some of the elements of recovery."'14
A. Tort Liability Present
The following six sections cover different substantive and proce-
dural state-law defenses which generally have been held ineffective
against the MCRA. The common thread in these defenses is the
continuing presence of at least some tort liability. When tort liabil-
ity is not negated, only defenses which are specifically directed
against the United States will succeed. For example, if the federal
government violates its own statute of limitations, or commits con-
tributory negligence through its agents, a MCRA claim could logi-
cally be denied even if the third party were liable in tort.
1. Statute of Limitations.-There is general agreement that
state personal injury statutes of limitations are not applicable in
MCRA cases.' 4' The appropriate federal statute of limitations is
136. United States v. Forte, 427 F. Supp. 340, 343 (D. Del. 1977), see supra note 34.
137. United States v. Studivant, 529 F.2d 673, 677 (3d Cir. 1976) (Biggs, J., dissent-
ing) (court denied the United States the right to assert claim against the New Jersey
Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund).
138. United States v. Haynes, 445 F.2d 907, 909 (5th Cir. 1971), see supra note 33.
The Haynes case is discussed in Dombrink, Medical Care Recovery Act; Defenses; Im-
munity of Husband Tortfeasor From Suit by Injured Wife: United States v. Haynes, 445
F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971), 26 JAG J. 138 (Fall 1971).
139. United States v. Neal, 443 F. Supp. 1307, 1312 (D. Neb. 1978), see supra note
26.
140. Hildebrandt v. Kalteux, 98 Misc. 2d 1062, 1064, 415 N.Y.S.2d 383, 385 (Sup.
Ct. Spec. Term 1979), see supra note 35.
141. See, eg., United States v. Angel, 470 F. Supp. 934, 935 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), see
supra note 22; Card v. American Brands Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1186, 1188 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (when private plaintiff asserts MCRA claim, the court should follow the federal
statute of limitations); Katz v. Greig, 234 Pa. Super. 126, 130, 339 A.2d 115, 119
(1975), see supra note 21; United States v. Housing Auth. of City of Bremerton, 415
F.2d 239, 242 (9th Cir. 1969), see supra note 19; United States v. Greene, 266 F. Supp.
976 (N.D. Il. 1967), see supra note 35; and, United States v. Jones, 264 F. Supp. 11, 14
(E.D. Va. 1967), see supra note 3.
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the three-year statute covering tort actions for money damages. 142
In a tort action, the statute normally begins to run when the tort
occurs. 143
Under the Medical Care Recovery Act, the statute of limitations
does not begin to run against the Government until it has notice
of the debt or it has paid the debt. Any other ruling could con-
ceivably allow the Government's right of action to be lost before
it had notice of the obligations.144
However, some statutory time limits will create a bar to MCRA
recovery. If the tort plaintiff must file before a certain deadline in
order to allege a cognizable claim, then tort liability is not recog-
nized before statutory compliance. 145 If the claim is not brought in
a timely fashion, then the MCRA does not apply since no recogniz-
able tortfeasor will exist under the statute. 146 When recovery is de-
nied under the MCRA, on the grounds that the statute of
limitations has expired, the underlying policy of permitting the gov-
ernment to recover for medical services against the tortfeasor is
frustrated.
2. Settlement and Release.-The principle is well established
that any settlement and release by the injured person will not bar a
MCRA claim for recovery. 147 Since the Act confers an independent
recoupment right on the United States, resolution of the victim's
claims does not concern the government's cause of action. 148 Even
if the MCRA were based solely on subrogation, any "general re-
lease obtained by a tortfeasor who has knowledge or reason to know
of a subrogated interest does not cut off the subrogated interest." 149
142. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(b) (Supp. 1984). See also United States v. Jackson, 572 F.
Supp. 181, 184 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (federal law controls), motion for reconsideration
denied, 577 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Mich. 1984); United States v. Limbs, 356 F. Supp.
1004, 1008-09 (D. Ariz. 1973), modified, 524 F.2d 799 (1975) (federal statute of limita-
tions controls although the government waited too long to enforce its rights); Forrester
v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 1157 (W.D. Pa. 1970) (government action timely under
federal statute); and United States v. Gera, 409 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1969), see supra note
76.
143. United States v. Angel, 470 F. Supp. 934, 935 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), see supra note
22.
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., United States v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 460 F.2d 17 (9th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 979 (1972) (uninsured motorist claim not perfected
unless claim is filed within the one-year limit of California Insurance Code section
11580.2).
146. United States v. Studivant, 529 F.2d 673, 675 (3d Cir. 1976), see supra note
137.
147. United States v. Wittrock, 268 F. Supp. 325, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1967), see supra
note 17.
148. United States v. Jones, 264 F. Supp. 11, 13 (E.D. Va. 1967), see supra note 3.
149. United States v. Guinn, 259 F. Supp. 771, 773 (D.N.J. 1966) (any insurance
company was presumed to have knowledge of the MCRA, since the insurance industry
heavily lobbied when the law was enacted).
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Irrespective of the theoretical basis of the law, the injured person
could not logically have been settling for medical expenses which
were provided without personal charge.150 As one court has noted,
the tort victim does not have "the power to contract away the right
of the government." 151 A release by the injured party would also be
an ineffective method of denying the government any contractual
benefits arising from the original injury. 152 In short, any MCRA-
related settlement or release in which the United States does not
participate is done at the peril of the tortfeasor and that individual's
insurer. 153
3. Comparative and Contributory Negligence.-Depending upon
whether the particular state embraces contributory or comparative
negligence concepts, negligence of the United States may bar recov-
ery completely or cause a proportionate reduction in any award.1 54
If the United States has caused the injury, then the MCRA is inap-
plicable, since the Act is predicated only on third-party liability. 55
Whether the contributory negligence of the victim bars MCRA re-
covery is much more doubtful, because the Act is not predicated
solely on subrogation to the right of the injured party. 156 In any
event, if the federal government is only passively negligent it can
still assert an indemnity claim against the actively negligent
tortfeasor.1 57
150. United States v. Winter, 275 F. Supp. 895, 896 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (United States
allowed to proceed despite settlement and general releases).
151. United States v. Greene, 266 F. Supp. 976, 980 (N.D. Ili. 1967), see supra note
35.
152. Blackburn v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 264 S.C. 535, 537, 216 S.E.2d
192, 194 (1975) (release by the victim still permits the government to collect under the
insurance policy).
153. United States v. Bartholomew, 266 F. Supp, 213, 215 (W.D. Okla. 1967), see
supra note 75.
154. California-Pacific Util. Co. v. United States, 194 Ct. Cl. 703, 731 (1971) (by
negligently sending military personnel into an unsafe place without minimal precautions
the United States was barred from any MCRA recovery). Where the contributory neg-
ligence falls under a comparative negligence system, the recovery will be reduced ac-
cordingly. See generally Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal
Rptr. 858 (1975) (California Supreme Court adopted comparative negligence). See also
Nikiforow v. Rittenhouse, 319 F. Supp. 697, 701 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (United States barred
from MCRA recovery by its own negligence).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 2651(a) (1982).
156. See, eg., United States v. Housing Auth. of City of Bremerton, 415 F.2d 239,
242 (9th Cir. 1969), see supra note 19; Cox v. Maddux, 255 F. Supp. 517, 524 (E.D.
Ark. 1966) (MCRA claim unaffected by accident participant's negligence), see supra
note 9.
157. Hipp v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 1152, 1155 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (Navy ambu-
lance collided with civilian defendant's automobile). The government may also be enti-
tled to set-off when sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act and a MCRA claim is
outstanding. Hale v. United States, 416 F.2d 355, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1969) (line of duty
problem arose in Federal Tort Claims Act).
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4. Interspousal or Intrafamilial Immunity.-Immunity between
various family members is regarded as a state procedural impedi-
ment not affecting the necessity to allege tort liability in a MCRA
action.158  As Circuit Judge Kalodner eloquently remarked in
United States v. Moore:
[T]he Medical Care Recovery Act confers on the United States
an independent right of recovery which is unimpaired by the va-
garies of state family immunity laws; otherwise stated, enforce-
ment of the Act is free of the impact of right-to-sue limitations
imposed by a state's family immunity laws .... The holding
that enforcement of the Act is subject to the vagaries of state
family immunity laws is grievous error, in utter disregard of the
Congressional intent in enacting the Medical Care Recovery Act.
Subjection of enforcement of the Act to vagaries of state law
would make a shambles of the Act. 159
5. Guest Statutes.-There is a split of opinion concerning the
effect of automobile guest statutes on the MCRA. In general:
[A] guest statute neither destroys the driver's basic tort liability
nor deprives a third person of his right to recover for the driver's
ordinary negligence. . . . Therefore, the essential element of a
suit by the United States to recover medical expenses-"circum-
stances creating tort liability"-is present, and a state created
limited defense without purgative effect is inapplicable.1 6°
However, several courts have wandered into the procedural/sub-
stantive thicket instead of focusing on the presence or absence of
tort liability. 161 Still, whether or not guest statutes affect the "sub-
stantive rights of litigants and cannot be waived" is essentially irrel-
evant. 1 62 The Act creates an independent right of recovery against
the tortfeasor that side-steps the legal obstacles placed in the path of
the automobile guest victim. 163
6. Collateral Source Rule.-The collateral source rule has been
an occasional cause of confusion under the Act. The tortfeasor de-
fendant is frustrated because the victim is entitled to recover from a
collateral source even after the federal government has successfully
158. United States v. Haynes, 445 F.2d 907, 910 (5th Cir. 1971), see supra note 33.
159. United States v. Moore, 469 F.2d 788, 790-92 (3d Cir. 1972), see supra note 16.
160. United States v. Forte, 427 F. Supp. 340, 342 (D. Del. 1977), see supra note 34.
161. See, eg., United States v. Oliveira, 489 F. Supp. 981, 982 (D.S.D. 1980) (South
Dakota guest statute prevents MCRA recovery). In Oliveira, the court noted that
"where the substantive law of the state bars the victim from recovery, the United States
is also barred." Id.
162. United States v. Neal, 443 F. Supp. 1307, 1312 (D. Neb. 1978), see supra note
26.
163. The independent cause of action under the Act is "not subject to the vagaries
and inconsistencies of the laws of the various states." Government Employees Ins. Co.
v. Bates, 414 F. Supp. 658, 659 (E.D. Ark. 1975), see supra note 31.
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prosecuted a claim for the same medical costs. 164 Defendants have
unsuccessfully argued that the right to recover from a collateral
source is lost since government medical expenses were given gratui-
tously.1 65 On the other hand, a good argument could be made that
anyone given medical care has earned those benefits in one fashion
or another. 166 Yet, under the Act, any danger of a double recovery
is precluded, since the United States can require the tort victim to
assign all collateral source rights to the federal government.1 67
B. Recovery Irrespective of Tort Liability
In two areas, the United States has sought recovery under the
MCRA irrespective of tort liability. The first situation concerns
state laws which generally negate any tort responsibility for medical
expenses; for example, workers' compensation statutes and no-fault
automobile insurance plans. Here, the overall judicial consensus
has been to deny MCRA recovery under these laws.
The second situation involves federal government claims to the
contractual rights of the victim under the medical payments clause
of an automobile insurance policy, or to the contractual rights of
the tortfeasors under uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage.
On a numerical basis, the United States has attained a recovery in a
fair number of these cases. However, recovery has been granted on
the grounds that the government is a third-party beneficiary or an
additional insured under the policy. The MCRA plainly does not
apply under such an approach. Fortuitous government recovery
could easily be cut off if insurance companies simply drafted their
policies to prevent government recovery where tort liability is not
established.
1. State Laws.
a) Workers' Compensation.-The MCRA "only applies in tort
situations and does not apply where the source of the claim is work-
164. Whitaker v. Talbot, 122 Ga. App. 493,496, 177 S.E.2d 381, 384 (1970) (nonac-
tion by the United States permitted the private plaintiff to assert a collateral source
claim for the value of government medical expenses).
165. Arvin v. Patterson, 427 S.W.2d 643, 644 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (failure of the
federal government to pursue its claim gave the tort victim free rein to seek collateral
source recovery); Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 201
N.W.2d 745 (1972) (plaintiff entitled to recover for medical expenses despite MCRA).
See generally Annot., 77 A.L.R.3D 366 (1977).
166. See Bennett v. Haley, 132 Ga. App. 512, 208 S.E.2d 302 (1974) (defendant not
entitled to show the government's evidence was aimed at reducing the victim's collateral
source claim); Whitaker v. Talbot, 122 Ga. App. 493, 496, 177 S.E.2d 381, 384 (1970),
see supra note 164.
167. 42 U.S.C. § 2651(a) (1982).
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men's compensation." 168 A workers' compensation action is a stat-
utory administrative proceeding arising exclusively out of
contract.169 Indeed, any assignment of the injured worker's rights
to the federal government is generally held to have no effect. 170
Since the right to the benefits under most workers' compensation
acts is by statute exercised exclusively against the employer, the tort
law concepts of the MCRA are truly irrelevant.171
b) No-Fault Automobile Insurance.-Many cases have discussed
the relationship between no-fault automobile insurance and the
MCRA. 172 The right of governmental recovery turns on the spe-
cific wording of the particular state's no-fault law in issue. More
precisely, recovery hinges on the judicial interpretation of the par-
ticular statute. If the court concludes that the statute negates tort
liability for medical expenses, then there will be no MCRA recov-
ery. 173 If the statutory language is construed to sanction at least a
168. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Co. v. Barnett, 445 F.2d 573, 575 (5th Cir. 1971)
(absence of statutory liability in tort defeats the MCRA claim). See also Wojtkowski v.
Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 27 Ariz. App. 497, 499, 556 P.2d 798, 800 (1976) (the fact
that Medicaid is not involved in MCRA recovery indicates the government does not
consider itself to be an insurer); Department of Employment Dev. v. Workers' Comp.
Appeals Bd., 62 Cal. App. 3d 500, 503, 133 Cal. Rptr. 236, 239 (3d Dist. 1976) (work-
ers' compensation claim not possible under MCRA because tort liability did not exist).
169. See, e.g., Sabino v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 52 Ala. App. 368,
373, 292 So. 2d 662, 667 (1974) (under state law an employer need not pay when the
employee was entitled to receive medical services under federal law).
170. See, e.g., Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. United States, 390 F. Supp. 142, 150
(N.D. Tex. 1975) (anti-assignment rule an integral part of state law); Highlands Ins. Co.
v. Daniel, 410 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (state statute voided an assignment of
compensation benefits by an employee).
171. Compare United States v. Gusto Distrib. Co., 329 F. Supp. 578, 579 (D. Mont.
1971) (exclusivity of state law precluded MCRA recovery), with United States v. Kirk-
land, 405 F. Supp. 1024, 1028-29 (E.D. Tenn. 1975) (assignment permissible because
the party entitled to be reimbursed was merely shifted and no double liability was
created).
172. See Note, The Federal Medical Care Recovery Act in No-Fault Automobile In-
surance Jurisdictions: Extension of the Federal Right of Reimbursement Against No-
Fault Insurers, 21 B.C.L. REv. 623 (1980).
173. In that fashion, at least six states have terminated MCRA recovery in automo-
bile insurance cases. Georgia: United States v. Travelers Indem. Co., 253 Ga. 328, 320
S.E.2d 164 (1984), answering question certified in, 729 F.2d 735 (1 lth Cir. 1984) (court
concluded Georgia legislature did not intend to make no-fault insurance companies lia-
ble to the federal government). Kentucky: United States v. Allstate, 754 F.2d 662 (6th
Cir. 1985) (allowing the United States to recover would make it a beneficiary of insur-
ance coverage it did not purchase and would deplete the recovery pool for actual vic-
tims). Michigan: Despite one holdout federal district court, the clear rule in Michigan
is to deny MCRA recovery under the state no-fault law. United States v. Jackson, 572
F. Supp. 181 (W.D. Mich. 1983), motion for reconsideration denied, 577 F. Supp. 901
(W.D. Mich. 1984) (no tort liability under state law meant no MCRA recovery), see
supra note 142; United States v. Allstate Ins. Co., 573 F. Supp. 142 (W.D. Mich. 1983)
(court constrained by congressional choice of recovery based on tort liability); Bagley v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 101 Mich. App. 733, 300 N.W.2d 322 (1980) (Michi-
gan legislature intended the no-fault act to prevent federal recoupment of medical ex-
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remnant of tort fault, then a claim may be successfully prosecuted
under the Act.174
The consequences of judicial decisions which bar MCRA recov-
ery under state no-fault laws are enormous costs. The bulk of
MCRA recoupment comes from automobile liability insurance poli-
cies. 175 The MCRA loss of such no-fault states as Georgia, Ken-
tucky, Michigan, New Jersey, North Dakota and Pennsylvania has
hurt the MCRA collection effort tremendously.1 76 If the recovery
of resources expended due to the actual fault of a third party is truly
the goal of the MCRA, then Congress should rework the Act to
create an exception for MCRA recovery under state no-fault auto-
mobile insurance plans.177
2. Contractual Rights.
a) Medical Payments Clause.-Medical payments coverage is a
common feature of automobile insurance policies. The coverage
pense from insurer); and O'Donnell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 404 Mich. 514,
273 N.W.2d 829 (1979) (same basic holding). Contra United States v. Spencley, 589 F.
Supp. 103 (W.D. Mich. 1984) (federal government interest supreme and should override
state no-fault law). New Jersey: New Jersey has apparently settled on an interpretation
of its law that denies a recovery against no-fault benefits. Sanner v. Government Em-
ployees Ins. Co., 150 N.J. Super. 488, 376 A.2d 180 (App. Div. 1977) (per curiam)
(federal government blocked by no-fault law from recovery against insurance company),
reversal aff'd per curiam, 75 N.J. 460, 383 A.2d 429 (1977). But see Lapidula v. Gov-
ernment Employees Ins. Co., 146 N.J. Super. 463, 370 A.2d 50 (App. Div. 1977) (medi-
cal expenses were incurred because the injured person might be required to pay;
therefore, the United States should recover based on subrogation). North Dakota:
United States v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 674 F.2d 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (United States not a
beneficiary of the North Dakota no-fault law). Pennsylvania: Heusle v. National Mut.
Ins. Co., 628 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1980), see supra note 37; Hohman v. United States, 470
F. Supp. 769 (E.D. Pa. 1979), affrd, 628 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1980) (absence of tort liabil-
ity prevented MCRA claim).
174. This is clearly the minority position, although maintained in several important
jurisdictions. Colorado: United States v. Criterion Ins. Co., 596 P.2d 1203 (Colo. 1979)
(en banc), see supra note 29. Florida: United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Holland, 283 So.
2d 381 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (court concluded Florida no-fault law substitutes the
insurer in place of the tortfeasor). New York: The New York no-fault law apparently
allows the United States to sue for medical expenses while the victim would be limited
in the possible recovery to basically non-economic items. United States v. Government
Employees Ins. Co., 605 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1979) (United States is a person entitled to
recover under New York law); Hildebrandt v. Kalteux, 98 Misc. 2d 1062, 415 N.Y.S.2d
383 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 1979), see supra note 35; United States v. Leonard, 448 F.
Supp. 99 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (federal government is a direct beneficiary under New York
no-fault law).
175. See, e.g., Long, The Federal Medical Care Recovery Act: A Case Study in the
Creation of Federal Common Law, 18 VILL. L. REv. 353 (1973); and Gotting, Recovery
of Medical Expenses and the Medical Care Recovery Act, 20 JAG J. 75, 77 (1965-66).
176. "The absence of a tortfeasor in no-fault states has severely curtailed the ability
of the United States to recover under the Act." United States v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 674
F.2d 750, 751 (8th Cir. 1982), see supra note 173.
177. See generally Note, supra note 172. See also Kasold, Medical Care Recovery-
Analysis of the Government's Right to Recover Its Medical Expenses, 108 MIL. L. REv.
161 (Spring 1985).
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normally provides that the insurer will pay all of the reasonable
expenses incurred within a set time from the date of any automobile
accident up to certain monetary limits.178 Payments may be made
to the named insured or to the health care provider, and are not
based on who was at fault in causing the accident. 179 Most courts
considering the matter have allowed the United States to recover
under a medical payments clause for the value of the medical ex-
penses caused by a third-party tortfeasor. 80
However, since an automobile "insurer is not a third person liable
in tort within the meaning of the federal statute,"181 recovery is not
based on the MCRA, s2 but on the insurance policy language. If
the United States fits into the policy terms as a third-party benefici-
ary,18 3 or as an additional insured,18 4 it will attain a recovery. Re-
covery is made more likely by the general rule that insurance
policies are strictly construed against the issuing company and in
favor of potential insureds and beneficiaries. 8 5 There is also the
notion that an insurer has reaped some sort of windfall when an
insured receives medical care at government expense and the gov-
ernment is prevented from recouping at least some of the medical
costs from the medical payments clause.186
Several courts have balked at allowing the United States to re-
178. See, eg., Blackburn v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 264 S.C. 535, 536, 216
S.E.2d 192, 193 (1975) (United States allowed to claim under the medical payments
clause).
179. Id.
180. See infra notes 181 and 183-84.
181. Lefebvre v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 110 N.H. 23, 25, 259 A.2d 133,
135 (1969) (no recovery allowed against medical payments coverage under the MCRA).
See also Bailey, Hospital Recovery Claims-Problems in the Fringe Areas, 7 A.F. JAG L.
REv. 7 (Mar.-Apr. 1965).
182. See, eg., United States v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 330 F. Supp. 1097,
1099 (E.D.N.C. 1971) (recovery allowed under third-party beneficiary theory), aff'd,
461 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1972).
183. See, eg., United States v. Automobile Club Ins. Co., 522 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir.
1975) (statutory obligation of federal government to provide medical care made it a
third-party beneficiary); United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 455 F.2d 789,
791-92 (10th Cir. 1972) (United States qualified as an organization that may be paid
under medical payments coverage); United States v. Government Employees Ins. Co.,
330 F. Supp. 1097, 1099 (E.D.N.C. 1971), see supra note 182; and United States v.
United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 431 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992
(1971) (court concluded the federal government is a third-party beneficiary).
184. United States v. California State Auto. Ass'n, 530 F.2d 850, 851 (9th Cir. 1976)
(incurring of expense by government made it an insured under the policy); Blackburn v.
Government Employees Ins. Co., 264 S.C. 535, 537, 216 S.E.2d 192, 194 (1975), see
supra note 152.
185. United States v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.2d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1974)
(court remanded for a determination of whether the United States fits within the
policy).
186. It is unclear why the government should attempt to take away an advantageous
contract from the insurance company. United States v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 455
F.2d 789 (10th Cir. 1972), see supra note 183.
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cover from the medical payments clause. Since the insured person-
ally incurred no medical expenses, these courts see no reason to
allow the United States to benefit from the independent contract
between the victim and the insurance company. 187 Defendants have
argued that an insured who works for the government indirectly
incurs the specific medical costs in issue. However, courts have not
so interpreted the policy language.1 88 Whatever the merits of the
controversy, there is nothing to prevent insurance companies from
drafting policy clauses which prevent the United States from recov-
ering under medical payments coverage.1 89 Indeed, some have ap-
parently already done so.190
b) Uninsured Motorist Coverage.-Uninsured motorist coverage
gives the victim the right to claim from his or her own insurance
company when an automobile accident is caused by another person
who does not have liability insurance.1 91 In the past, the United
States could recover, under most policies, as an additional in-
sured 192 by virtue of the loose and general policy language.1 93 At
187. See, ag., Brackens v. Allstate Ins. Co., 339 So. 2d 486, 487 (La. Ct. App. 1976)
(since the victim had no obligation to pay, neither the injured person nor the govern-
ment can collect); Hollister v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 192 Neb. 687, 688, 224
N.W.2d 164, 165 (1974) (general case law is that no expenses are incurred); and Gordon
v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 238 S.C. 438, 120 S.E.2d 509 (1961) (pre-MCRA compila-
tion of cases describing when medical costs are incurred).
188. See, e.g., Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Vail, 623 S.W.2d 170, 171-72
(Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (medical services given as part of an employment package held to
be incurred by the patient); Smith v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 52 Wis. 2d 672, 190
N.W.2d 873 (1971) (medical care is a benefit of employment accrued by the federal
employee).
189. See United States v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.2d 1355, 1360 (9th Cir.
1974) (Duniway, J., dissenting), see supra note 185.
190. Documents on file at the Claims Division of the Naval Legal Service Office,
San Diego, California. See also United States v. Allstate, 606 F. Supp. 588 (D. Hawaii
1985) (under standard Hawaii no-fault policy, United States was neither an insured nor
a third-party beneficiary entitled to reimbursement for medical expenses rendered fol-
lowing a solo motorcycle accident).
191. See, e.g., United States v. Commercial Union Ins. Group, 294 F. Supp. 768
(S.D.N.Y 1969) (uninsured motorist clause language allowed MCRA recovery by the
United States).
192. See, eg., Cushman v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 401 So. 2d 477 (La. Ct. App.
1981) (dictum) (lack of authorization to assert MCRA claim defeated otherwise valid
United States recovery from uninsured motorist coverage); Transnational Ins. Co. v.
Simmons, 19 Ariz. App. 354, 507 P.2d 693 (1973) (under policy language, the United
States entitled to recover as an insured); United States v. Government Employees Ins.
Co., 440 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1971) (definition of insured allowed United States recov-
ery); and United States v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 312 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Conn. 1970)
(United States was an insured under uninsured motorist coverage). See generally
Fleishman, Hospital Recovery Claims and Uninsured Motorists in the State of New York,
9 A.F. JAG L. REv. 30 (July-Aug. 1967); and Grossman, Hospital Recovery Claims-
Under Uninsured Motorist Laws, 7 A.F. JAG L. REV. 15 (Mar.-Apr. 1965).
193. See, eg., Government Employees Ins. Co. v. United States, 376 F.2d 836, 837
(4th Cir. 1967) (United States within the definition of a person entitled to recover).
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one point, California actually required uninsured motorist policy
language which mandated a MCRA recovery, 194 but the California
Legislature amended the law to deny future MCRA uninsured mo-
torist claims unless permitted by the insurance company for some
reason. 195 Since any recovery in this area is possible only because of
generous policy provisions, both states and insurance companies
can tighten policy language to curtail MCRA uninsured motorist
payouts without fear of federal government barriers. 196
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Medical Care Recovery Act stands at a crucial point. State
no-fault laws are removing the major source of recoupment under
the Act. Insurance companies are tightening the language in medi-
cal payments and uninsured motorist clauses, denying another re-
covery fund. The ambiguous wording of the MCRA itself generates
uncertainty and confusion in the courts. The time has come for
Congress to revamp the Act in light of over two decades of
experience.
First, Congress needs to clarify that the MCRA overrides all
state defenses, whether procedural, substantive, or contractual.
That should put an end to the procedural versus substantive debate
in its various manifestations.
Second, the Act should give the federal government explicit and
absolute flexibility with respect to intervention, joinder, or in-
dependent action. This procedural flexibility should also include
the right to remove any state action into federal court as necessary,
and be based solely on the MCRA itself.
Third, Congress must deal with the workers' compensation and
automobile no-fault laws. A provision that the MCRA allows re-
covery despite any contrary workers' compensation or automobile
no-fault statutes is essential to an effective MCRA.
Fourth, any contractual blocks to recoupment from uninsured
motorist and medical payments coverage must be overcome. Con-
gress has a very difficult choice here, because this proposal is sure to
generate opposition from the insurance industry. However, if the
194. See United States v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 460 F.2d 17 (9th Cir.
1972), see supra note 145.
195. In response to the Hartford decision mentioned in the preceding note, the Cali-
fornia Legislature amended section 11580.2(c)(4) of the California Insurance Code to
preclude any MCRA recovery based on an uninsured motorist clause. See Tara v. Cali-
fornia State Auto. Ass'n, 93 Cal. App. 3d 227, 155 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1979) (brief discus-
sion of the response to the Hartford case).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Allstate Ins. Co., 306 F. Supp. 1214, 1215 (N.D. Fla.
1969) (uninsured motorist policy language sufficiently precise to deny any MCRA re-
covery as an additional or named insured).
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idea is to increase MCRA recovery, this would be a very productive
change.
Fifth, as an aid to collection, the statute should specify that pri-
vate attorneys are empowered to seek recovery under the MCRA.
for the use and benefit of the United States. In order to provide a
more persuasive incentive for the attorney to cooperate, a portion of
any recovery should be reserved for the client-victim and for the
private counsel. For example, a reservation of one-fourth for the
client and one-fourth for the attorney would provide an incentive,
while still leaving a significant recovery for the United States. 197
Sixth, statutory recovery rates must be made more realistic and
equivalent to comparable civilian treatment. The Office of Manage-
ment and Budget rates are far too low.
Seventh, the MCRA "claim" needs to be turned into a strong
"lien" on the assets of the tortfeasor, and possibly on the insurance
company. That would give the government some leverage which is
now lacking to force quick settlement of a MCRA assertion.
CONCLUSION
The Medical Care Recovery Act fairly requires tortfeasors to pay
the federal government when their acts result in government ex-
penditures provided to an injured party for medical care. Unfortu-
nately, changing concepts of liability for fault under state statutes
and insurance contracts have limited the effectiveness of the Act.
In fact, "[the present puzzling condition of the law does little jus-
tice to the United States or to the States."' 198 The time has come for
Congress to perform a checkup. Based on the suggestions in this
Article, the Act can become a more effective tool for recovering
sums rightfully belonging to the government.
197. Providing for attorney fees for private counsel who expend effort on the gov-
ernment's behalf is only equitable. "Thou shalt not muzzle the ox when he treadeth out
the corn." Deuteronomy 25:4 (King James). See also Cockerham v. Garvin, 768 F.2d
784, 787 (6th Cir. 1985) (trial court directed to divide tort recovery fund equitably
between victim and government for care generated under the MCRA).
198. United States v. Studivant, 529 F.2d 673, 679 (3d Cir. 1976) (Biggs, J., dissent-
ing) (federal noncompliance with the New Jersey Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment
Fund bars a MCRA action) see supra note 137.
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THE MEDICAL CARE RECOVERY ACT
APPENDIX
TITLE 42 UNITED STATES CODE
§ 2651. Recovery by United States
(a) Conditions; exceptions; persons liable; amount of recovery; sub-
rogation; assignment
In any case in which the United States is authorized or required
by law to furnish hospital, medical, surgical, or dental care and
treatment (including prostheses and medical appliances) to a person
who is injured or suffers a disease, after the effective date of this
Act, under circumstances creating a tort liability upon some third
person (other than or in addition to the United States and except
employers of seamen treated under the provisions of section 249 of
this title) to pay damages therefor, the United States shall have a
right to recover from said third person the reasonable value of the
care and treatment so furnished or to be furnished and shall, as to
this right be subrogated to any right or claim that the injured or
diseased person, his guardian, personal representative, estate, de-
pendents, or survivors has against such third person to the extent of
the reasonable value of the care and treatment so furnished or to be
furnished. The head of the department or agency of the United
States furnishing such care or treatment may also require the in-
jured or diseased person, his guardian, personal representative, es-
tate, dependents, or survivors, as appropriate, to assign his claim or
cause of action against the third person to the extent of that right or
claim.
(b) Enforcement procedure; intervention; joinder of parties; State
or Federal court proceedings
The United States may, to enforce such right, (1) intervene or
join in any action or proceeding brought by the injured or diseased
person, his guardian, personal representative, estate, dependents, or
survivors, against the third person who is liable for the injury or
disease; or (2) if such action or proceeding is not commenced within
six months after the first day in which care and treatment is fur-
nished by the United States in connection with the injury or disease
involved, institute and prosecute legal proceedings against the third
person who is liable for the injury or disease, in a State or Federal
court, either alone (in its own name or in the name of the injured
person, his guardian, personal representative, estate, dependents, or
survivors) or in conjunction with the injured or diseased person, his
guardian, personal representative, estate, dependents, or survivors.
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(c) Veterans' exception
The provisions of this section shall not apply with respect to hos-
pital, medical, surgical, or dental care and treatment (including
prostheses and medical appliances) furnished by the Veterans' Ad-
ministration to an eligible veteran for a service-connected disability
under the provisions of chapter 17 of title 38.
§ 2652. Regulations
(a) Determination and establishment of reasonable value of care
and treatment
The President may prescribe regulations to carry out this chap-
ter, including regulations with respect to the determination and es-
tablishment of the reasonable value of the hospital, medical,
surgical, or dental care and treatment (including prostheses and
medical appliances) furnished or to be furnished.
(b) Settlement, release and waiver of claims
To the extent prescribed by regulations under subsection (a) of this
section, the head of the department or agency of the United States
concerned may (1) compromise, or settle and execute a release of,
any claim which the United States has by virtue of the right estab-
lished by section 2651 of this title; or (2) waive any such claim, in
whole or in part, for the convenience of the Government, or if he
determines that collection would result in undue hardship upon the
person who suffered the injury or disease resulting in care or treat-
ment described in section 2651 of this title.
(c) Damages recoverable for personal injury unaffected
No action taken by the United States in connection with the rights
afforded under this legislation shall operate to deny to the injured
person the recovery for that portion of his damage not covered
hereunder.
§ 2653. Limitation or repeal of other provisions for recovery of
hospital and medical care costs
This chapter does not limit or repeal any other provision of law
providing for recovery by the United States of the cost of care and
treatment described in section 2651 of this title.
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